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National Sustainable Security Infrastructure

. Our nation cannot sustainably face the challenges of the 21st Century with a National Security Infrastructure architected to engage strategies, tools and methodologies focused on fighting wars under a Cold War Command and Control paradigm. Continuing to do so would only blind us to the most probable strategic threats we now face that lay outside of a Cold War and Global War on Terrorism context. Continuing at current trends, our national security systems could potentially contribute to a crippling of our nation’s broader socio-ecological fabric, while our national security experts spend far too much of our national attention and resources on problems stemming from “the last war.” The Project on National Security Reform (pNSR) has made it abundantly clear that we have delayed essential reforms for so long that more radical transformation is now necessary.

. President Obama recognizes the need for a change in our National Security System that goes far beyond the ending of the Iraq war. He and his key advisors are likely to engage a National Sustainable Security Infrastructure that is architected to extend far beyond successful countermeasures to terrorism, while maintaining sufficient historical capabilities to meet challenges from adversaries with asymmetric attack plans, conventional weapons and WMD. However, in addition, the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure must do far more than extend our traditional defense systems. It must now engage a re-architected national security infrastructure to successfully address the opportunities and dangers of economic long-wave phenomenon, strategic shifts in the global market, climate change, peak oil, and other aspects of global change and novel 21st Century challenges. As if this were not difficult enough to accomplish in the window of opportunity available to successfully anticipate, prevent and manage these concerns in a proactive manner, it must be accomplished with many of the resources that could have been used for a graceful transition, now squandered on an elective war in Iraq and an economy in collapse (or L-shaped recovery, if you prefer). Address the Hard Questions, Mired in Political Impass We now have to address the harder questions that have been taboo over the past eight years. The question, “What must be done to ensure that our nation seizes its window of opportunity to address our emerging mission critical sustainable security gaps?” is only the start. Now that a significant transformation toward a National Sustainable Security Infrastructure can no longer be delayed without serious consequences, how should new approaches to management and governance be engaged? How should our most advanced scientific and technological resources be redirected to enable our national security initiatives to successfully target our society’s highest priorities? How can we immediately get to work on long-neglected current and emerging challenges and opportunities, with budgetary and acquisition policies that will resist change and perpetuate antiquated systems for years to come? Address Emerging Threats While Enhancing Conventional Capabilities At this time in history, we no longer have the luxury of squandering our national security resources on ineffective bureaucracy at the expense of our highest priority mandates. Neither can we lose touch with the less novel necessities of shoring up conventional weapon systems in this process of finally facing the strategic threats that have so long be neglected and ignored regarding global change and our L-shaped recovery with high unemployment and trillions of dollars washed out of our economy. Unfortunately, in the complexity of the world we now face, terrorism and traditional adversaries will not disappear. However, we can no longer get more worried about an unsuccessful plane bombing than the fact that we were unable to vaccine even 2% of our population before the peak of the H1N1 pandemic second wave. Even as a mild pandemic, the H1N1 influenza sickened over 25 million Americans, hospitalizing over 100 thousand. H1N1 killed over 10,000 in the U.S. during 2009. Even though conventional weapons may drop out of the media spotlight, as we engage soft power and integrative power policies to avoid the threats of terrorism and conventional war in the short run, we cannot be left defenseless in the medium and long-term against old or new adversaries. We also have a moral obligation, while we retain the capabilities to engage significant military power, to address the need for modernizing weapon systems that achieve “smartpower” objectives through deterrence. In addition, if we know that these conventional weapons generate unnecessarily large collateral damage if ever used, we must continue to refine the effectiveness of systems to eliminate violent and coercive powers, with little or no impact on innocents. Even though, in the best-case scenarios, countermeasures to conventional threats may remain idle under smartpower strategies, we unfortunately cannot miss anticipatory opportunities to modernize antiquated counter-measures to coercive or violent adversaries, while at the same time we are under significant pressure to direct new resources to address social crisis associated with global change and economic downturn. Engaging Strategic Focus, Agility and Convergence That said, without rapid adequate transformation directing immediate attention and significant resources to prevention and management of social crisis associated with economic downturn and global change – our nation’s shift to sustainable human security could remain under-funded for years under rigid hierarchical systems. We cannot wait for transformation until collapsing systems force change – only after the emergence of strategic vulnerabilities reach criticality. This would leave the United States highly susceptible to catastrophic conditions to which we cannot successfully adapt without unacceptable losses in the quality of life and functional life capacity of Americans. The establishment of a National Sustainable Security Infrastructure, with a U.S. Resilience System as a robust component, provides Americans with an alternative course toward sustainability and resilience in the face of all our significant 21st Century challenges. With our National Sustainable Security Infrastructure and U.S. Resilience System building out with adequate stimulus resources during the first years of the Obama Administration, we can now face the discomforting questions of whether the U.S. government and American society in the years and decades ahead will be able to transform themselves successfully. We will have the infrastructures in place to help our most vulnerable Americans weather deep economic downturn. We will have established an infrastructure and system to anticipate and proactively address the most strategic 21st Century challenges to our society, which are less likely to come from terrorism or threats to our sovereignty from conventional military threats alone, than from collapses in local, regional, and global socio-ecological carrying capacities over the next two decades. The pNSR argues that a U.S. National Security Reform discourse must now be engaged at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Those assembling to architect the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure (NSSI) and U.S. Resilience System (USRS) are also further arguing that the discourse and initial experiments have long been engaged, yet without sufficient resources or visibility during our 43rd President’s tenure. The American public, with appropriate USRS infrastructures in place, are ready to act in concert with the top experts to be a part of the solution in our transition to a viable NSSI. Engaging Sustainable Security and Resilience Systems Now Our key representatives with a clear vision of the NSSI and USRS are now engaging the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure and U.S. Resilience System at the international, national, federal, regional, state, and local levels – all the way down to the community, neighborhood, and household levels. We are fully aware that resilience and sustainability in America will only come by ultimately empowering the American public to actively embrace resilience and sustainability in service from the local level up, while American leadership in the Executive Branch and Congress simultaneously provides American society with the policies, mandate and resources to engage solutions productively through timely and measurable systematic interventions. The U.S. Resilience System and the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure are now ready for this engagement with the whole of American society, but need the policy and financial means to carry out their vital mandates. It is time to immediately fund productive engagements of the U.S. Resilience System through federal resources to be matched over time with private sector, non-profit, state, and community resources. In the ashes of the Iraq war, the long suppressed USRS has now become the least controversial and most important component of our National Sustainable Security Infrastructure. With soft power in ascendancy, the long neglected, non-coercive and non-violent aspects of the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure can finally be released to shape the rapidly emerging 21st Century elements of what will truly make America great, strong, and secure during the 21st Century. In doing so using a FAC paradigm that has interoperable value across the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure, the USRS becomes the most crucial instrument of transformation for America’s national security. Only from broad ownership and involvement in such a fundamental transformation will American society meet the challenges ahead successfully. During the campaign and the Presidential transition period, Barack Obama, Joe Biden, and their supporters did a brilliant job of engaging the public in ways that reach far beyond the usual political boundaries. However, this will become harder to maintain without the appropriate and timely build out of the U.S. Resilience System and the transformative restructuring of the U.S. Sustainable Security Infrastructure, as we have seen from the first year of the Obama Administration. As American society now tests novel approaches and engages a process that can anticipate, cushion and protect our society from the impacts of economic downturn and world changing global events, the systematic build up of our sustainable security systems are essential. Without concerted attention and a new level of cooperation and unity of effort enabled by a maturing U.S.R.S. within a transforming U.S. National Sustainable Security Infrastructure, we could see casualties, not just in the thousands (as in the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina), but potentially in the hundreds of thousands, if not millions of Americans (such as due to a serious pandemic or collapsing ecosystems). Unfortunately, these numbers, which seem so large from an American perspective, are already playing out in other parts of the world (e.g., Indian Ocean Basin Tsunami, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, Darfur, the global food and global water crises). The “Official Future” and Carrying Capacities The most important activity for the Obama/Biden Administration to engage is to once and for all time dispel the myth of the “Official Future of the United States” as having no carrying capacity concerns that might impose any limitations on the way we behave individually and collectively in our global, regional, and local ecosystems and socio-ecological environments. The idea that America can grow exponentially in its population and consumption of non-renewable resources without serous negative consequences to Americans and the world is scientifically bankrupt. We, as a nation, can still grow in our wealth and power during the 21st Century; but only if we refine our definitions of wealth and power to include the wisdom and moral courage to live well and do good free from the misconceptions of our health, quality or life, and functional life capacities being intrinsically tied to exponential material consumption and excess military adventurism, which has brought our nation to the precipice of domestic economic and global ecological collapse. Unfortunately, the concept of the “Official Future of the United States” with no carrying capacity constraints has had significant political influence over the minds of Americans, when promulgated by the White House in recent administrations. It has reinforced and sometimes promoted an attractive myth that serious carrying capacity concerns, such as global climate change, need not be considered in the mainstream of public discourse, legislation, and our nation’s political agenda. The dominant message from the Executive Branch in recent years – in contrast to the scientific consensus – has been that there are no carrying capacity issues (including, but not limited to climate change and peak oil) that the United States need concern itself with in the process of maintaining and expanding the viability and superiority of U.S. systems. This is a fraudulent concept playing on some of our most basic human desires to live in comfort without constraint. The overwhelming evidence from systems science – now emerging from careful observation of our planetary environments – is that further uncaring over-extension of our society’s global socio-ecological limits within a mass consumption and non-renewable resource-dependent global market is no longer feasible. The growing global outcry over the dire outcomes from further extending the “official future” beyond sustainable levels can no longer be ignored. Americans will now benefit more from balanced, realistic, and less ideological messages and policies, matched by behavioral and social patterns that pragmatically open new balanced economic patterns and frameworks for sustainable security. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the transition toward resilience and sustainability is going to be the shift in consciousness and the behavior change necessary in the vast majority of Americans. Ultimately, America’s future, and the health, quality of life, and functional life capacities of its citizens, are not up to their representatives in Congress and the White House alone. It is even more dependent upon the willingness of Americans to shift from being a part of the problem in over-extending carrying capacities to embodying within themselves the wisdom and balance to live with resilience and sustainability within a much reduced ecological footprint. It is dependent upon a shift demonstrated by their attitudes and behaviors. It is in this shift that the U.S. will find its economic recovery and leadership in the 21st Century. This shift is fundamental to the climate change goals laid out in the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in December 2009. If Americans continue to project the blame for the rapid economic downturn on the decisions of the Bush Administration alone, which has unfortunately hidden the evidence of carrying capacity concerns from the American people in the interests of short term gain, we as a culture will not have the deeper understanding, momentum and initiative necessary to rectify our course and move forward as one. Americans must now use the opportunity of having a president who truly believes in the power of a form of governance of the people, by the people, and for the people. Americans must assume not only the rights of citizenship, but also the responsibilities of citizenship — to be the change that we now collectively need to recover America’s future, and reinvent it within the constraints and still abundant opportunities within a 21st century context. America’s Resilient and Sustainable Future America’s future is not pre-destined. It is of our making. There can be no “official future” without carrying capacities. We must build together a future that is resilient and sustainable from a set of scenarios, which provide opportunity and freedom for the individual pursuing their own happiness in a manner that also address the common good and the basic needs of all. Every American must realize that a change in U.S. policies in the form of a National Sustainable Security Initiative — together with their individual and collective behavior engaged through the U.S. Resilience System — can now secure a resilient and sustainable future for all Americas and their communities of interest globally. As a result of this broad-based shift, the U.S., and most other economies around the world, now reeling from the over-extension of basic carrying capacities, will have a way forward through similar resilience systems and approaches to sustainable security. Resilience and sustainability are not something that the United States will do to or for other nations. It is something our destiny shares and benefits from, with all other humans and societies on this spectacularly beautiful small planet. Now challenged by potentially catastrophic human-induced global changes, it is time to retire the blind neglect of the “official future.” In its place, we now begin a more sophisticated and science-based exploration of scenarios and options to deal with the many constraints and opportunities that we must shape to create futures that can be ours by wise, proactive, and cooperative engagement. A Proactive, Transparent, U.S. Resilience System Proactive engagement in the fundamental transformation of U.S. infrastructures is now essential to ensure America’s and humanity’s successful adaptation under current carrying capacity constraints. Additionally, by engaging thoughtful anticipatory design and sharing a common operating picture and prospective best practices with peoples around the world, we can collectively engage the U.S. Resilience System as an alternative to clandestine, retrospective analysis hidden within stovepiped, classified systems alone. As a result of adopting the open source platform of the USRS, freely accessible to the American public, we now have a vehicle for cutting through delayed response from calcified and ineffective bureaucracies, unable to escape historical cycles of reactive and ineffective adaptation to fundamental change. We now have an approach to overcome the tendencies to engage only incremental reforms in a National Sustainable Security Infrastructure initiative sufficient to meet our 21st Century challenges head on. Our society’s discourse regarding sustainable security on a broad and deep level within the U.S. public agenda and policy agenda is now being engaged and heeded. Because of its centrality to the health, well-being, prosperity, and security of Americans and their communities of interest worldwide, it has to have President Obama’s and Vice President Biden attention to a far greater degree than in the first year of the Obama Administration. Thus an ideologically based “official future” serving historical vested interests, at the expense of the interests of the majority of the American public, can be replaced with an evidence-based sustainable future for all Americans. Discourse on the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure It is time to engage the discourse between the people of the United States and their federal government on the development of a new interoperable National Sustainable Security Infrastructure capable of enveloping our entire society’s sprawling domestic and international security apparatus. The National Sustainable Security Infrastructure must be designed from a 21st Century science and technology base with a 21st Century management and governance process — sufficient to assess and meet the challenges of the next few decades. The Project on National Security Reform (pNSR) clearly makes the case that incremental reform is now longer viable and radical transformation is now necessary. In its Analysis of Options for Reform, the pNSR states: “Considered separately or as a whole, these reforms are robust; even radical. They need not be adopted in toto, and hybrid solutions drawing upon some or all of these options are possible. However, the United States will need to adopt some combination of the reforms offered in this paper if it wants a national security system that consistently produces unified purpose and effort.” As the policy development process of the pNSR discourse meets processes engaged to build and test the next generation national security infrastructure, the requirement set of a National Sustainable Security Infrastructure must not only be successful in defeating and degrading external threats; It must also protect against the risks of implosion or significant degradation from relying on antiquated systems beyond their design limitations. Arguably, in a time of economic downturn, maintaining massive expenditures on a large defense enterprise, extended far beyond the capacities of its original enterprise architectures, could be one of the U.S. National Security System’s most fundamental vulnerabilities. Layering on more patches to an already overextended and collapsing paradigm, which promotes hard power as synonymous with national security to the exclusion of other national security imperatives, would increase, rather than decrease, the vulnerability of Americans. This is not only because it may unnecessarily bleed resources from other essential expenditures protecting the health and well-being of the American public and their communities of interest overseas. In addition to deflecting our federal government’s gaze from more important issues of national sustainable security, it may give a false sense of security, while creating a moral hazard of excess military capacity misperceived by a future Executive Branch or Congress as military superiority. In his last speech about the military industrial complex President Eisenhower warned the American people against our defense sector growing beyond the point of utility and control, while becoming a self-perpetuating instrument of war. The use of our own biological weapons against the American people and our own government by one or more of our own top military scientists during the Anthrax attacks of 2001 was only one of a number of incidents of this kind to become widely known. One wishes that the American people and its elected representatives had heeded the lessons of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, and its closest moment of mutually assured destruction in the Cuban Missile crisis, to more wisely and assertively turn us back from further attempts to seek security primarily through further escalation of military means. Now with many obvious failures in our ability to assert U.S. public policy through hard power alone (counting the losing of the Vietnam War and the failure of the Iraq War at great expense, in lives and our public treasury), the U.S. military has further lost its value as a deterrent in the eyes of the world. In addition, the unilateral assertion of its military power in Iraq and in the broader “Global War on Terror” has created great suspicions around the world about the United States’ sincerity in working constructively with other nations for mutual benefit. We further extend our military reach into Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and potentially into Iran at great risk of simulating more Al Qaeda attacks against us that we can possibly anticipate and quash around the world. The fact of Osama Bin Laden still being at large and a strong Taliban resurgence is strong evidence of this. it is now abundantly clear that military means may, in some cases, provide an essential security window in which to conduct diplomacy and constructive policy, but it does not provide a constructive outcome by itself in the complex world we now live in. The assertion of hard power in the absence of constructive policy, especially if it violates the Geneva Convention and other international laws, such as in the cases of torture in Abu Ghraib prison and in detention centers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, further degrades U.S. stature in working with other nations and their people. The Obama Administration’s National Sustainable Security approach must now remove the stain of this country’s assertion of hard power under highly suspect and questionable conditions during the first decade of the 21st Century. Turning Toward Sustainable Security It is clearly time to move toward a more stable foundation for sustainable security. We can count our nation as lucky that the lethal game of confusing excess military capacity with military superiority has not been even more immediately devastating to the health and well-being of the American public and to other people around the world. With the introduction of DoD Doctrine 3000.05 (focusing on reconstruction and stabilization), DoD Instruction 2205.02 (beginning the focus on activities on preventing conditions leading to war), and the closing of the Iraq war, we now have the opportunity to turn our nation forward again toward sustainable security. It is time to provide an infrastructure designed to sustain security with less likelihood that U.S. ambitions to retaliate or assert forward-leaning foreign policy through military means to the detriment of our national security, as in the case of the Iraq war, will go unchecked. Although perhaps not receiving the same level of attention from the American public as health care reform among immediate concerns – an American public now directly burdened by the health care crisis under the further weight of significant economic downturn – transformation of national security requires immediate attention from the new Administration. This work may perhaps need to be conducted a bit more quietly than the primary focus on the health of Americans. As the Obama Administration solidifies the top layers of its new security apparatus answerable to our new President, it will be significantly challenged to provide a budget addressing the emerging national sustainable security priorities, in ways that may not yet be intuitively apparent within the mainstream National Security discourse. President Obama and his Administration may be forced to make the most sweeping changes to U.S. National Security infrastructure since the end of World War II, whether these changes are politically popular or not. Counter-pressures by traditional defense industry special interests and the proponents of perpetual war will likely be significant to improving the sustainable security for the American public, if it includes any moves to redirect budgets of historic but outdated importance to new sustainable security programs. President Obama’s affinity for soft power and his Secretary of State’s affinity for smart power (combining an interweaving of military power with diplomacy) will likely shift the National Security apparatus, at least at the top, from its center of gravity under Dick Cheney and George W. Bush leaning forward toward preemptive war on real and imagined state and stateless threats. The current Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognizes the need for this transition and has already undertaken efforts to shift resources away from kinetic war toward reconstruction and stabilization, and to a lesser degree toward prevention and management of socio-ecological conditions that might in some cases enable the U.S. to expend resources it could better use toward other societal activities outside of war. However, this shift so far has been more cosmetic under the challenges of unraveling the debacles of U.S. overextension of hard power in Iraq and Afghanistan to the exclusion of more effective soft power and integrative power solutions. A more nuanced effort to prevent and manage social crisis, ideally when possible, short of war, is likely to replace the Bush Administration’s preoccupation with the “Global War on Terrorism.” The purpose of this discourse on the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure is to explore the advantages and disadvantages of transformation, as well as more incremental reform toward establishing a viable National Sustainable Security System, in a time when our national security could be potentially seriously compromised due to systems collapses outside of the traditional domain of “defense,” as well as being further impacted from other conventional and novel threats. However, to expect that those that have invested so heavily in war will passively accept reductions in conventional military assets and anti-terrorism would be misguided. During the upcoming months and years we will have tactical attacks on the U.S. and , whenever any incidence of this kind happens, there will be special interests that will cease the opportunity to proclaim weakness and blindness in our leadership as it refocuses on our more strategic threats, while continuing to maintain our military preparedness and response capacities. The Complexity of Sustainable Security To state that our National Security System must be architected to be sustainable is obvious. However, for the general public and their political representatives to grasp the relatively complex set of ideas that will shape an optimized National Sustainable Security System may be quite difficult. There may be an understandable political calculus involved in selling the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure as an incremental improvement of our largely 20th Century National Security Infrastructure, stemming from the cold war-inspired National Security Act of 1947. Nonetheless, an incremental approach to reform that would get us to sustainability in 15 to 20 years, when systems collapses are already on the near term horizon, will not be acceptable. The Obama Administration may provide simple explanations to the public for the complex adaptive systems of the NSSI. It would do so, at great peril, if over-simplified educational approaches lock these new systems into the over-simplified framework of political rhetoric that informs legislation which encumbers all developmental processes within the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure by extruding them through current hierarchical controlled acquisition systems. Contemplating the enemy within, in terms of self evaluation of the consequences of our own actions is always a difficult process, especially for government and bureaucracies interested in their own perpetuation and expansion regardless of circumstance. Given the maturity and inertia of the U.S. bureaucracies, this issue may become one of the largest struggles between our new President and Congress, as well as between Obama Administration Cabinet members and their civil service and enlisted service sector layer, if the NSSI discourse is not engaged appropriately, neither dumbing down the science, nor misleading the public as to the intentions and essential scope of the NSSI. A backdrop is provided below for why a broadened definition of the U.S. National Sustainable Security Infrastructure is necessary now, and why we need to start developing and implementing rapid prototyping versions of a U.S. Resilience System immediately (whether one believes reform is sufficient or that deeper transformation is necessary). The key to exploring the new possibilities that transformation might provide to counter systems collapses within American critical infrastructure and around the world in advance of systems reaching the point of criticality is to implement FAC teams within the nascent U.S. Resilience System, tested against 10 simulated and real world “experiments,” over the next two and a half years. During and following these tests, it should be abundantly clear why new systems requiring substantial resources to build will be essential to ensure the success of efforts to prevent and manage social crises, that might otherwise compromise the health and well-being of Americans and the socio-ecological systems upon which their lives depend in months and years ahead. As Barack Obama assumes the full power of the Presidency in his second year, he and his Administration will need to work with Congress on economic stimulus packages, directed beyond the horizon of the bailouts and the shoring up of the banks and financial services industry provided so far. Moneys must also be spent on essential new infrastructure elements, which will soon be a critical factor in assessing and managing social crises emerging from our current economic downturn. Along with the challenges stemming from the historical artifacts of assuming the problems of past administrations and the conflicting agendas of foreign actors, our new President must also have National Sustainable Security Infrastructure assets, such as those available through the U.S. Resilience System, to be prepared to deal with a world spinning out of balance. Shifting Our Point of View on What Constitutes Sustainable Security There is no question regarding there being well resourced and well organized communities of good and smart people dedicating their efforts to maintaining American infrastructure against conventional military, WMD, terrorist, and natural threats. It is widely understood that a significant level of effort is being performed on essentially all parts of the hard and conventional soft infrastructure that protects America from various threats. This class of defense activity is necessary for an advanced society in our highly complex world of competing economic and social forces. What has not been widely understood in the late 20th Century and the first few years of the 21st Century, is that the seeds of our society’s degradation, collapse, and demise may arise from the over-extension of our strengths. Many cultures and religions throughout history have emphasized balance and centering as essential to health and harmony. Unfortunately, from within mainstream America accustomed to the past half century of massive, undifferentiated growth and excess military capacity, it has been nearly impossible to help the American public and their leadership understand that within the successful rapid expansion of advanced economies and social systems — especially those dependent upon non-renewable resources, easy credit and large commitments of resources to coercive policies and state-sanctioned instruments of violence — there is a natural tendency to overshoot sustainable conditions. Essential cues of excess and vulnerabilities to the infrastructures are missed, until negative impacts are inevitable. As our institutions start approaching carrying capacities, identifiable counter-pressures to further expansion often emerge and can be scientifically evaluated -- as long as the evidence of over-extension is not hidden by interests that benefit in the short term from the perpetuation of current misguided trends. Unfortunately, the electorate and their representatives must ensure that the very institutions that have provided us with material wealth, comfort, and protection against domestic and foreign threats do not perpetuate the expansion of their bureaucracies with such momentum that their strengths extend their initiatives beyond the point of diminishing returns, and potential collapse. This threat in a substantial and rapid economic downturn has been all too real in the past few years. The curbing of special interest politics will play a key role in ensuring that unbiased evidence and science drives our nation’s decision making on our sustainable security. But the problem is not simply a matter of the most crass self-interested manipulation of policy. In a time of massive transformation such as this, substantial inertia and potential conflict arises as change conflicts with the fundamentals of long-standing threads of culture and common patterns of public and institutional behavior. It is not difficult to find highly competent American defense analysts (with a point of view grounded in training in 20th Century warfare, and extensive experience within the defense community during the early years of the 21st Century) who hold the belief that conventional U.S. national security and defense systems are evolving well. Given their focus on the more tactical elements of defense, perhaps directly experiencing gaps in the robust and dynamic state of the systems they work on, there will be a natural tendency to be protective of the defense industries. They will naturally want to expand defense systems they have labored hard within, and, in some cases, have defended at the risk of their life or livelihood. Those who make a living at an operational level within the defense sector, be they enlisted or civilian, may also have a tendency to believe that as long as the funding increases in defense of recent years can continue, our nation will be secure. They remain unaware of the evidence to the contrary. Unfortunately, these belief structures tends to bias citizens and their leadership against the evidence of human-induced climate change, especially if further reinforced by religious and political leaders and religious, political, or military doctrine. In the years ahead, even those working at the tactical level within government bureaucracies or smaller supportive defense companies and other industries, will need to have access to improved situational awareness of global change and economic issues to gain a better systems perspective. The U.S. Resilience System, as part of the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure can provide a common operating picture, and better educational opportunities and just-in-time information resources, which over time will help all Americans redirect their careers, as opportunities shift away from their current occupation, but open up new horizons in the larger sustainable security infrastructure, including its green economy. Having pointed out some of the vulnerabilities to sustainable security that emanate from the U.S. defense sector, short of successful strategic attack with weapons of mass destruction, multi-system economic collapse or significant global changes, the traditional defense/intelligence sector, including DoD, DHS, IC, Department of Justice, HHS, and other departments of U.S. federal and state government as well as the civilian military and homeland security complex) are not the main focus of concern within the NSSI, when stating that there is a need to broaden the U.S. national security infrastructure to address our most glaring mission-critical gaps within an extended definition of the U.S. National Sustainable Security Infrastructure, the most significant mission critical gaps appear to arise from a suppression of the potential of new non-coercive/non-violent soft power and integrative power programs. Generally, the majority of the American people have shared a common view regarding the robustness of mainstream American defense infrastructures for so long, many of which have significant if aging architectures stemming from the mid to late 20th Century. They do not yet thoroughly understand the new threats of social crisis associated with significant global market shifts, severe economic downturn and global change as sustainable security threats. It is this different class of the threats, vulnerabilities, and National Sustainable Security Infrastructure requirements, which now requires the development of new non-coercive infrastructure to enable the U.S. to remain resilient and sustainable in the early to mid 21st Century. The fact that there is a class of significant imminent threats and vulnerabilities, which have been known to the scientific community for three decades or more, that are just now beginning to be perceived as possible emerging threats and vulnerabilities worthy of attention as national security threats by the White House, DoD, and other federal agencies, is the major reason the U.S. requires a more broadly defined National Sustainable Security Infrastructure — with a better anticipatory capacity. The U.S. is already a couple of decades late in engaging significant resource flow to develop the core scientific, technological, and operational infrastructures to reduce the current and emerging risks to the American public and their communities of interest around the world in these new areas of concern relating to potential severe economic downturn and global change. Human Security Index and Anticipatory Science What appears to be grossly inadequate in maintaining sustainable security in the U.S. is our ability to provide an anticipatory sustainable human/machine infrastructure that addresses the issues assessed in the Human Security Index, (as a generational improvement over the Enhanced Human Development Index). The issues placed in appropriate context by the Human Security Index, especially under severe economic decline and global change as projected and validated over the past 30 years, for example within the World3 model, can and must be monitored and managed far more carefully. The bottom line is that during a severe economic downturn, a highly lethal pandemic, or standard-run global change scenarios (including one or more of the following: rapid and significant climate change, peak oil, severe water shortages, ecosystem collapses), the safety net will deteriorate rapidly for well over a billion people and potentially 2 billion people worldwide. Today, we do not have a resilient and sustainable infrastructure to enable the American people, and their communities of interest worldwide, to maintain basic needs and social order under scenarios like the collapse of our highly complex, interconnected global economy. The reality is that U.S. mass consumption is shrinking and is likely to continue to shrink, as China’s and India’s mass consumption trends grow until they collapse under significant global counter-pressures, or alternatively are wisely brought into balance using an anticipatory science base. To think that the U.S. is protected against massive multi-system discontinuities in its soft infrastructure is no longer an issue of myopia. It can only be explained as denial. The collapse over the recent years of the U.S. housing industry, banking system, credit industry, energy supply systems, transportation industry, and health system makes it evident to the unbiased observer that significant change must take place to protect the resilience and sustainability of American society. Although we are rapidly applying the economic tools invented during the Great Depression to the current downturn, our country is far more complex today. It is responding to the 110th Congress’ economic stimulus packages sluggishly at best. For the purposes of examining the sustainability of our National Security apparatus, it would be prudent to question whether the tools of 75, 50, 25, or even 10 years ago are still well adapted to managing severe economic downturn. What if they are not up to the task of dealing with the complex set of systems failures we are now experiencing in our domestic and global markets? Their primary limitations of our current systems stem from the fact that they were not designed to deal with late cycle exponential growth and the complexity of our globally interdependent markets. To just look at one factor, a half-century ago we were living in a cash economy. Today, a far larger amount of financial transactions are in flux every day than exists in our entire global monetary system. The considerations of exponential global socio-ecological change and ecosystem carrying capacity issues are in fact an order of magnitude more complex. The American economy and its societal infrastructures as they are currently organized – including its historic National Security Infrastructure-- are highly dependent upon domestic mass consumption and inexpensive greenhouse gas emitting energy systems. Unfortunately, current U.S. systems are not immune, as current conditions demonstrate, to massive multi-system downturn and potential collapse. Severe social consequences of complex systems collapses can only be prevented and managed if systems disorders can be observed, anticipated, and managed as complex adaptive systems. Incremental single point fixes, no matter how massive, will only make our society-wide systems -- as they are approaching carrying capacities -- even more vulnerable to uncoverable collapse. However, the old saying of “as General Motors goes, so goes the nation” is thankfully no longer true. The industrial base of 20th century America still has value. However, our nation has transcended their central importance to our economy and social structure. Within a global, knowledge economy, we now have the raw materials for rapid societal transformation toward resilience and sustainability, but not without investing in systems that are architected to assist the rapid and ongoing transformation of American systems which develop and manage sustainability and resilience as central goals for our society during the 21st century. U. S. Resilience System Within the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure discourse, the U.S. must soon confront whether it can now engage sufficient resilient and sustainable infrastructure in a timely manner to fall back on during significant economic downturn and global change. Will the U.S. government have appropriate systems in place to protect American citizens, and U.S. interests around the world, from the types of social crises that will emerge during significant economic downturns or societal systems collapses. The "U.S. Resilience System," will need to be scaled up quickly, before the consequences of its absence are inevitable. Engaging the USRS after the fact may not be an option, given the substantial social costs involved in fully growing and enabling it. The delay in building and scaling the U.S. Resilience System is likely to result in significantly larger human and economic cost than doing so proactively, assuming it were possible to build resilience into our infrastructure after the fact. In 2008, there were 775 million people without sufficient food today around the world. David Nabarro, Special Assistant to the Secretary General of the United Nations, in November of 2008 stated that the UN believes that number will go to over 1.1 billion people with insufficient access to food within three years, given estimated impacts from the current global economic decline. Well over a 800 million people do not have access to clean water. Life-sustaining water supplies are expected to become rapidly more scarce and inaccessible to ever-larger populations around the world as global changes accelerate. Ecosystems in many countries, and even in local areas in the United States such as the water systems and agricultural systems in the Southwest, are approaching massive discontinuities and collapse. Those who have an understanding of complex adaptive systems, and who have been in many real world events and simulated crisis events with top officers and key decision makers in this country and other countries, know that hierarchical controlled systems often fail to respond effectively. They all too often miss the window of opportunity they have to address a novel challenge successfully, as we saw in the H1N1 vaccination program missing the window to take the peak off of the 2009-H1N1 second wave in the United States. Instead of listening to analysts that stated that a multi-modal immunity strategy should be used, high level government officials applied linear deductive reasoning and attempted to assert their control over multi-billion dollar budgets with old technologies that were clearly not going to work. As in the H1N1 pandemic and Hurricane Katrina, the Indian Ocean Tsunami and Cylcone Nargis in Myanmar (Burma) unaided by anticipatory science, trigger point-based best practices, situational awareness, clear management of mission critical gaps, and the ability to engage unity of effort amongst diverse, independent institutions, the fog of social crisis rapidly envelops the representatives that citizens trust to protect them, while resilience and sustainable security collapse in complex, large-scale disasters. The current situations in Zimbabwe and Burma (Myanmar) are clear examples of this problem, and how over-dependence on coercive and violent force further reduces a society’s capacity for resilience and sustainable security, while centralized decision-makers struggle to remain in control of escalating chaotic circumstances. Many natural and simulated experiments have been followed to study what the top officers see and don't see in fast moving events, when they are limited to the use of retrospective science. Recollection of the Hurricane Katrina disaster and the financial crisis of 2008/2009 will quickly dispel any myth that this cannot happen within the United States. It is clear that U.S. infrastructures within this country and overseas are not currently designed to address the types of complex problems we now face. In the absence of a National Sustainable Security Infrastructure built on a Focus, Agility, and Convergence model of management and governance with an embedded U.S. Resilience System, we have been vulnerable. Our government has largely ignored carrying capacity issues and instead has engaged incremental solutions that just exacerbate a larger set of problems. That has to change. Advancing Science, Technology, and an Empowered Citizenry We need systems architected with knowledge that is grounded in the sciences of complexity and globalizing intelligent social networks that are tested and proven to be resilient against threats like a highly pathogenic pandemic and climate change, as well as against novel terrorist threats, such as 747s flown into buildings by jihadists, countries like China gaming world currency policy, and denial of service attacks by cyberterrorists. The HHS-led National Framework is a good start, but it misses the necessary activities (such as third generation biosurveillance capabilities and systems of organizing behavioral and social immunity) to even deal effectively with a single source threat like a pandemic. In addition, the silos separating the HHS-led National Framework from the competing and sometimes conflicting National Strategy put out by DHS since the release of the National Framework leave our nation vulnerable to mission critical delays in our Incident Command Systems. However, the greatest vulnerability is that we do not have the systems in place to constructively engage citizens at the home, neighborhood, and community levels, where most of the key decisions are made and where actions have to be taken that will determine who will live and who will die in a pandemic, as well as in other system crash scenarios. On the international front, our current systems are not well suited to the Phase 0, 1, and 5 interventions (according to the taxonomy of the DoD phases of war) that are now needed to stabilize situations like Iraq and Afghanistan or reduce the likelihood of falling into future wars that could have been prevented. If someone like Al Santoli, a former marine twice awarded the Purple Heart medal is correct, sending more "irregular warfare specialists" into places like the Muslim communities of the Philippines with “guns, barbed wire and antennas” during the current food crisis is going to do little to avert the very high likelihood of growing social crisis and civil war. The people of the Philippines, Sierra Leone, North Korea, Burma (Myanmar), the D.R Congo, and a myriad of other nations already facing the overextension of their socio-ecological carrying capacities, need a path toward resilience and sustainability. Short of a true path to resilience and sustainability, they are potentially not far behind Sudan and Zimbabwe, in terms of social crisis and socio-political collapse during a significant global economic downturn. Establishing viable resilience and sustainability in collapsing socio-ecological conditions requires a different kind of infrastructure, which is the essence of the U.S. Resilience System. The problem is not primarily a physical infrastructure problem and it is not going to be resolved by regime change alone. The problems we are now facing are large-scale and escalating socio-ecological challenges that are unaddressed by the massive coercive national security systems around the world. There is widespread agreement that the US has a world-class national security infrastructure hardened against a coercive enemy, natural disasters short of global change, and even economic downturns down to the equivalent of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Nevertheless it is not responsive to managing sustainable human security under conditions of multi-system meltdown or significant global change. A U.S. Resilience System must be architected and scaled up in advance of social crises arising from such eventualities, if it is to provide a sufficient safety net to American citizens and their communities of interest around the world. Decisions We Must Make Now We do not yet have the systems we now require in terms of knowledge management and intelligent social networks, operating as complex adaptive systems (except in early prototype form). Our current National Security infrastructure, in all its complexity and robustness, is not designed to prevent, respond to, recover from, or mitigate multi-system socio-ecological meltdowns at the global, regional, and local level. The systems that exist at DoD, State, USAID, and many NGOs are a start, but they do not go far enough or deep enough to address our 21st century global concerns. Our homeland security systems are moving in the right direction, but are poorly architected for citizen engagement at the community level. If we are truly trying to assess our mission critical gaps within our National Sustainable Security Infrastructure, we will have to go further to understand some painful realities about our current situation. When a national government is $55 trillion in debt and its people are living at potentially many times their sustainable ecological footprint and are 30% to 40% beyond their current economic means, throwing trillions more at 20th century infrastructures that are in multi-system collapse is not a viable solution. We must, of course, take action to cushion the impact of the declines in our 20th century infrastructures on the American public, while we build viable and resilient 21st Century infrastructures. That said, where is the source of investment in the U.S. infrastructures going to come from, if China, Japan, and other foreign investors in the United States decide that throwing many more trillions into a U.S. economic recovery is no longer in their economic or political interests? What happens if the implosion of the 40 nations that are now in food crisis begins to expand rapidly to other nations to significantly impact the global economic system and the stability of regions, like the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia? What if Southeast Asia, for example, falls into social crisis (as the U.S. Resilience Summit 2008 explored in its simulation of the aftermath of a category 4 typhoon hitting the Mekong Delta)? It is great that our fiber networks and computers will continue to function properly, our special forces are well armed, our bombs are smarter, and our nuclear weapons are still deployable, but that misses the point regarding the protection of the health and well-being of the American people. We need a viable resilient and sustainable infrastructure that the American people and the good people of other nations around the world can rely on to ensure their access to food, clean water, health services, energy, transportation, communication, waste management, and other basic essentials as depicted in TIDES adaptive logistics system. This is feasible but not under the limitations of our current National Security infrastructure. The Project on National Security Reform is a start, but its current discourse must go broader and deeper into creating viable vehicles to affect the changes that are necessary to address severe economic downturn and global change in a timely manner. This is the point of leverage in which the U.S. Resilience System must be introduced into the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure discourse. We have to seize the current window of opportunity to build a viable National Sustainable Security Infrastructure, and rapidly scale the experiments with the U.S. Resilience System, and its FAC Teams, Resilience Networks, Adaptive Logistics Systems, and Trust Networks. The American public and the world have taken a deep breath during the current change in American presidential leadership. This window of opportunity will close quickly if the real changes we expect from the Obama Administration do not address the challenges at hand, while the pain of social crises increases. The rapid decline in President Obama’s popularity during his first year in office is an indication of the need to move quickly to secure the public’s trust in their leadership. The Window of Opportunity for the Obama Administration Citizens at home and abroad have tentatively and temporarily suspended disbelief in the viability of current U.S. systems in the hopes that Barack Obama will perform political and economic magic. Even if President Obama and his Administration is able to sustain a substantial turn around the current economic crisis in the first few years of his first term, it is still best that we rapidly put in place a U.S. Resilience System as a fallback during the current economic recovery efforts (e.g., the American car industry bailout, the housing industry bailout, the insurance industry bailout, the banking industry reform, the credit industry bailout, the restructuring of the U.S. energy systems, and health system reform). If the recovery goes like clock work under the Obama Administration so that multi-system meltdown is avoided, and we implement a viable National Sustainable Security Infrastructure with a robust, rapidly growing U.S. Resilience System, we will be able to focus on helping the expanded number of vulnerable communities within the United States and around the world cope with the difficult recession and recovery periods ahead, while ramping up to mitigate the impacts of global change. If the U.S. recovery plans do not go as well as the American public and its leadership expect in a timeframe that is acceptable to all the global stakeholders, having a National Sustainable Security Infrastructure with a robust U.S. Resilience System would guarantee that Americans would have a viable system of healthy food, clean water, renewable energy, green transportation, communication, and other necessities to fall back on, during the second decade of the 21st century, at a fraction of our current ecological footprint. By participating in the severity-indexed, trigger point-based, prospective best practices in the U.S. Resilience System, Americans can actively become a part of the solution in preventing and managing undesirable aspects of economic downturn and global change. With the U.S. Resilience System as a free open source platform for their actions, Americans will not be looking for politicians to blame. They will be actively transforming their lives building the green economy and living sustainably within resilient communities. In this way, Americans will again inspire the citizens of other nations to become part of the solution. Americans will collectively be leading the way toward successfully mitigating the impacts of global climate change, with the citizens of other societies. It is proposed that the following U.S. Resilience System components (already operating in several pilots around the U.S.) are operating effectively throughout the United States and in all regions around the world by 2012: - Resilience Networks for Managing Resilience and Sustainability - FAC-enabled Health, Humanitarian, and Disaster Management Teams - Adaptive Logistics and Distribution Intelligent Networks - Trust Networks for Proactively and Non-coercively Managing Conflict To have these systems fully functional by 2012, we need to immediately start focusing our social capital and invest a small percentage of our economic stimulus in the new elements of the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure, in particular within the U.S. Resilience System. These new investments in fundamental infrastructure providing a safety net for all Americans can then become a platform for rapidly growing our green economy. This new economy is at the heart of our economic recovery and our ability to face global change in the years and decades ahead with a wisdom that protects and enlivens all humanity.

Here are the concepts and
deliverables necessary to develop a National Sustainable Security
Infrastructure Initiative under a National Security Directive with a
champion at the NSC Senior Director level. Ideally the National
Security Directive would also specify a prominent link to the Vice
President and his National Security agenda. It is proposed that the
Obama soft power agenda would be spearheaded under this National
Security Directive. It would include the U.S. Resilience System and
its components, including:

Resilience
Networks, FAC Teams, STAR-TIDES, and Trust (Human Interoperability)
Networks, as a part of a larger reorientation of government toward
soft power and sustainable security.

Craig Chellis and I (potential with the help of others on the PDC
staff) will put together a draft of a National Sustainable Security
Plan and Roadmap. After gaining your input and potentially holding
discussions on it at NPS and NDU, we plan to advance it as a part of a
strawman proposal for a National Security Directive. We would then
take the National Security Directive proposal to the appropriate
stakeholders in the NSC and the Vice President's office. Craig and I
will meet on this again tomorrow afternoon around 4:30 PM Eastern
time. Please let me know if you have an interest in joining us.
Below is a potential agenda. Please feel free to provide other
potential agenda items, if you like.

Obama's Soft Power Agenda

The Concept of a National Sustainable Security Infrastructure

The U.S. Resilience System

National Security Directive

National Sustainable Security Infrastructure (NSSI) Plan and Roadmap

NDU and NPS Meetings on NSSI

Key Supporters and Champions

Taxonomies
Threats and Vulnerabilities
Overlay of Assessments and Indicators
Development and Adoption of Validated Standard Tools and
Methodologies

Please provide comments or questions below.

On Jan 8, 2009, at 6:14 PM, Brown-VanHoozer, Stefania Dr, NII/DoD-CIO
wrote:

Michael/Craig,

Still on board with the effort. We might want to invite Mr.
Fullerton who
has developed small NSSI over the years both within DoD and within the
NGO world. He is the person who has been approached to put another
one together at the global level.

Alenka

Alenka,

I met with Dave Franz tonight and a number of the key players at USAID,
USDA, DHS that are working on sustainable security in regards to the global
and national food supply. There is a strong sense of the important of the
NSSI from Dave's work trying to establish conditions to avoid conflicts with
WMD and the rest of the group in address the rapidly growing vulnerabilities
regarding food supply.

We look forward to connecting with you and Mr. Fullerton.

Mike

Michael D. McDonald, Dr.P.H.
President
Global Health Initiatives, Inc.

Coordinator
U.S. Resilience Summit 2008

On Jan 9, 2009, at 8:26 AM, Brown-VanHoozer, Stefania Dr, NII/DoD-CIO wrote:

Michael,

To make sure we all continue to stay on the same page, food, health,
transportation, housing, education, military force protection, cyber
security, etc. would all be addressed by the NSSI involving all factions of
our society and those of other nations. The caution here is not to give
the appearance of segregation, which has a tendency to lead to
"stovepiping." We need a focal point, which I find refreshing that you have
taken that role since we need someone that can pull the pieces together. I
would suggest that as the key players are approached from the various
interagency and intercommunity that notice is given for others who are
working with you to pull this together.

Chuck, when could you take some time to speak either Michael and I on the
smaller NSSI efforts you have done in the past?

Alenka

I am approaching the necessity of creating a National Sustainable Security Infrastructure (NSSI) -- the essential U.S. infrastructure for soft power -- as I approached the necessity of creating the National Health Information Infrastructure (NHII) with Dr. C. Everett Koop (former U.S. Surgeon General), Al Gore (when he was Vice President), and the 110 organizations that we brought together in the NHII. The NHII representing approximately $2.4 billion as a collective multi-organizational enterprise. Both the NHII and the NSSI require interoperability as a core principle. However, the NSSI is, of course, an order of magnitude larger and more complex than the NHII. For that reason, the NSSI require more evolved management and governance approaches, as are being architected into the U.S. Resilience System.

President-elect Obama and Vice President-elect Biden are committing our country to a soft power approach to achieving our society’s goals globally. They understand the necessity and central value of interoperable infrastructure and sustainable security for the United States, but neither are yet fully briefed on the complexities of a U.S. National Sustainable Security Infrastructure sufficient to enable the U.S. to face its domestic and foreign affairs challenges, given current and emerging circumstances. We are in the process of developing a strawman National Security Directive proposal, which will be shared first for comment with key advisors, then a broader set of interagency representatives. Then it will be shared with a broader set of stakeholders through the media -- in advance of bringing this initiative to the full attention of the incoming Vice President and President for them to act on.

As tested in the U.S. Resilience Summit 2008 simulation, the U.S. Resilience System has distinct advantages as a fundamentally non-violent and non-coercive greenfield interoperable FACT (Focus, Agility, and Convergence) infrastructure initiative. It is being rapidly architected, prototyped, and tested in the U.S. and globally with 21st Century scientific, technical and socio-ecological principles at its core. It wraps legacy systems within a component-based architecture, without being limited by their significant impediments to migration toward fifth and sixth generation FACT systems (http://www.dodccrp.org/files/IC2J_v1n1_01_Alberts.pdf).

In contrast to the USRS, many of the legacy systems in the U.S. federal government have matured over many decades and have significant impediments to rapid evolution toward interoperability, FACT-enablement, resilience, and sustainability. They are embedded in institutions with management and governance structures and cultures highly dependent upon stovepiped classified systems, that poorly organized for internal interoperability, let alone interagency cooperation and open knowledge sharing. They are even less likely to evolve on their own accord within a 15-year window to address new gaps in the U.S. sustainable security infrastructure. However, with the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure initiative we are proposing, broader, more effective, and more efficient models utilizing intelligent social networks addressing mission-critical gaps can be achieved.

The strategic points of failure we are now witnessing in our society would have ideally been faced years ago when we had ample resources and time to transition. Given that we no longer have the luxury of time or significant excess capital throughout US society to gracefully evolve expensive, antiquated systems, new, highly efficient systems taking advantage of intelligent social networks and knowledge management systems must wrap the best of all viable mature U.S. institutional systems.

These new systems must be capable of facing our current and emerging mission critical gaps in sustainable security. It is essential that new solutions are engaged under the NSSI to achieve our sustainability goals with fully interoperable core systems for the essential interagency co-operation. This has to be done in a manner that allows our resilience and sustainability goals to be achieved, even under scenarios in which several traditional institutional systems slated for integration were degraded through attack or natural events, or collapsed under the economic and socio-ecological conditions that are being projected in downside scenarios regarding the second decade of the 21st Century.

That is why it is essential that the U.S. Resilience System (USRS) be rapidly architected, developed, and tested as one of three multi-organizational enterprise umbrellas under the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure (NSSI). The USRS must receive substantial enough investment in 2009 and 2010 so that, as mission-critical institutions with significant legacy system challenges teeter on the verge of collapse, we have replicable NSSI FACT components that can be rapidly extended into, and scaled within, the other two major enterprise umbrellas under the National Sustainable Security Infrastructure. This would be most efficiently accomplished through USRS components using robust validated and verified FACT capabilities tested thoroughly over the next 2.5 years with all traditional institutions engaging their FAC teams in 10 simulated and natural experiments. The ten USRS experiments are proposed to start with 400 to 600 FAC-capable teams identified by mid-March 2009 growing to 10,000 fully FAC-enabled teams by mid-2011.

We must ensure that the NSSI initiative plan and operational efforts, over the next few months and throughout the next 2.5 years, guarantee that the U.S. Resilience System (USRS) infrastructure components are rapidly self replicating and appropriately extend and scale to the requirements within its own domains. In addition, we must be in a position to ensure the American people and their communities of interest globally -- with the full support of the President and Vice President of the United States -- that the USRS components are designed to survive a continued meltdown of the U.S. economy and the emergence of escalating global change problems.

The USRS components must be architected to scale and extend with infrastructure self-similarity into the non-classified elements of theother two enterprise umbrellas of the NSSI (including the traditional institutions that are not limited to non-coercive and non-violent activities in a second umbrella, and all other traditional non-violent institutions in the third umbrella) to assist in their evolution to a soft power paradigm and full interoperability within the NSSI. This should be done for two reasons: first, it will enable the U.S. to be far more competitive and collaborative within our traditional understanding of our nation’s opportunities and positions of leadership globally; and second, it provides American society, and its communities of interest globally, with a hedge against scenarios of severe economic downturn and global change during the next decade -- and perhaps even more importantly during the third and fourth decades of the 21st Century).

Obviously, systems that ensure that the basic needs of Americans are met (such as food, water, shelter, health, education, energy, occupation, transportation, and security, including but not limited to force protection and cybersecurity) are essential to American society and must be immediately protected against all key eventualities. Given the collapse of the housing market, banking industry, credit industry, large insurance companies, and the stock market, with very large potential discontinuities looming on the horizon in our energy sector, health care, employment, traditional security services, water supplies, and other global ecosystem assets, it would be prudent for any stimulation package this year to ensure that core NSSI functionality address the basic needs of Americans early on in the Obama Administration and the 111th Congress.

The basic and advancing needs of Americans under the emerging green economy would be most rapidly addressed through the US Resilience System -- as the first fully functional umbrella under the NSSI. The plans for the NSSI and its USRS development initiatives should be presented to the President and the Vice President in the form of a National Security Directive proposal within the next 60 to 90 days. This National Security Directive authorizing our country’s shift to a soft power paradigm must provide appropriate guidance within economic stimulus packages, as well as through other funding mechanisms to develop the NSSI and the USRS as the foundations of our emerging U.S. 21st Century economy, before many more trillions of dollars are lost (pumped into cushioning the fall of twentieth century infrastructures) with very little retained value and return on investment to the American people.

It is now clear, that we have to build sustainable security provisions sufficient to address conditions of significant economic downturn, potentially even reminiscent of the Great Depression. However, if further exponential increases in global change concerns continue to mount, we must be prepared for even more sweeping and unprecedented change. During the past half century, the citizens of the United States, and their government, have, in general, not been accustomed to economic downturn, uncertainty regarding its key institutions, and austerity to the degree we are now facing in the years ahead. That said, our nation has faced dire circumstances before (e.g., the American Revolution, the Civil War, the Great Depression). It has always emerged stronger because of the agility in which our society pragmatically addresses the challenges before us. With a truly viable National Sustainable Security System and U.S. Resilience System designed to match current and emerging circumstances, we can successfully face the challenges ahead. With these parameters in mind, we must now establish a more dynamic mechanism for engaging the people of the United States and our government in anticipating, preparing for and responding for lasting sustainable security through the National Sustainable Security Initiative.

I look forward to working with you to engage the NSSI initiative discourse.

Mike

Michael D. McDonald, Dr.P.H.
President
Global Health Initiatives, Inc.

Coordinator
U.S. Resilience Summit 2008

howdy folks